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R
ecent research has highlighted several aspects of monetary policy un-
der Chairman Alan Greenspan, noting that the Federal Reserve was
forward looking, smoothed interest rates, and focused on core inﬂa-
tion.1 SomeanalystshaveestimatedTaylorrulesthatincorporatethesesalient
features of monetary policy, and have shown that monetary policy actions
taken by the Federal Reserve in the Greenspan era can broadly be explained
bytheseestimatedTaylorrules. Usingacoremeasureofconsumerpriceinﬂa-
tion(CPI),BlinderandReis(2005)estimateaTaylorruleover1987:1–2005:1,
showing that the estimated policy rule tracks actual policy actions fairly well.
Using Greenbook forecasts of core CPI inﬂation, Mehra and Minton (2007)
estimate a forecast-based Taylor rule that shows this estimated policy rule
also ﬁts the data over 1987:1–2000:4.2 More recently however, Taylor (2007,
2009) has argued that monetary policy was “too loose” during most of the
period from 2002–2006, in the sense that the actual federal funds rate was too
lowrelativetothelevelsimulatedbyasmoothedversionoftheoriginalTaylor
rule.3 Inthissimulationexercise,Taylor(2007)assumesresponsecoefﬁcients
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1 Blinder and Reis (2005) have hailed Chairman Greenspan’s focus on core, rather than head-
line, inﬂation as a “Greenspan innovation.” The measure of core inﬂation used excludes food and
energy prices.
2 The sample period used in Mehra and Minton (2007) ends in 2000, given the ﬁve-year lag
in the release of the Greenbook forecasts to the public.
3 The original Taylor rule relates the federal funds rate target to two economic variables—
lagged inﬂation and the output gap, with the actual federal funds rate completely adjusting to the124 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of 1.5 and .5 on inﬂation and the output gap, as in the original Taylor rule, but
instead uses headline CPI as a measure of inﬂation.4
ThisarticlehighlightsanotheraspectofmonetarypolicyintheGreenspan
era: The measure of inﬂation used in monetary policy deliberations has also
been reﬁned over time. This can be seen in the semiannual monetary policy
reports to Congress (Humphrey-Hawkins reports), where inﬂation forecasts
by the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have been
presented using different measures of inﬂation over time. Thus, through July
1988,inﬂationforecastsusedtheimplicitdeﬂatorofthegrossnationalproduct,
thereafterswitchingtotheCPI.InFebruary2000, theCPIwasreplacedbythe
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deﬂator measure of inﬂation and
from July 2004 onward inﬂation forecasts employed the core PCE deﬂator
that excludes food and energy prices.
Though these different measures of inﬂation may move together in the
long run, over short periods these inﬂation measures may behave differently
because of factors such as energy prices and changes in coverage and def-
initions. As a result, the Fed’s inﬂation target may vary depending on the
measure of inﬂation used, thereby affecting the desired setting of the federal
fundsrate.5 Previousempiricalworkhasnotpaidmuchattentiontothisissue,
as most analysts estimate Taylor rules under the assumption that the measure
of inﬂation used in policy deliberations did not change during the Greenspan
years.6
target each period as shown below (Taylor 1993):
FRt = rr∗ + απ
 

















where rr∗ is the real interest rate (assumed to be 2 percent), π is actual inﬂation, π∗ is the





is the output gap, απ is the inﬂation
response coefﬁcient (assumed to be 1.5), and αy is the output response coefﬁcient (assumed to
be .5). Inﬂation in the original Taylor rule was measured by the behavior of the gross domestic
product (GDP) deﬂator, and the output gap is the deviation of the log of real output from a linear
trend. According to the original Taylor rule, the Federal Reserve is backward looking, focused on
headline inﬂation, and follows a “non-inertial” policy rule.
4 Using the policy response coefﬁcients from the original Taylor rule and headline CPI as a
measure of inﬂation, Poole (2007) also shows that the actual federal funds rate is too low relative
to the level prescribed for most of the period from 2000:1–2006:4 (see Figure 1 in Poole [2007]).
Poole, however, does not conclude that policy was too easy because he alludes to the change in
the measure of inﬂation used in monetary policy deliberations during this subperiod.
5 Kohn (2007) has highlighted these considerations.
6 While Blinder and Reis (2005) and Mehra and Minton (2007) estimate Taylor rules using
a core measure of CPI inﬂation, the measure of inﬂation used in Taylor (2007, 2009) is headline
CPI and the one used in Smith and Taylor (2007) is the implicit deﬂator for GDP. An exception
is the paper by Orphanides and Wieland (2008), in which a forecast-based Taylor rule is estimated
using the semiannual Humphrey-Hawkins inﬂation forecasts. More recently, Dokko et al. (2009)
and Bernanke (2010) have highlighted the issue of the measurement of inﬂation used in monetary
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This article re-examines the issue of whether monetary policy actions
taken during the Greenspan years can be described by a stable Taylor rule. It
considers two Taylor rules that differ with respect to the measure of inﬂation
used in implementing monetary policy. According to both these rules, the
Greenspan Fed was forward looking, smoothed interest rates, and linked the
federal funds rate target to expected inﬂation and the unemployment gap.
However, according to one Taylor rule, the Federal Reserve used headline
CPI inﬂation, and, according to the other, it used core CPI until 2000 and core
PCE thereafter. The later speciﬁcation departs from the usual assumption
that a Taylor rule has to be estimated using a single measure of inﬂation.7
Both the policy rules employ real-time data on economic fundamentals such
as the pertinent inﬂation measure and the unemployment gap. As noted by
Orphanides (2001, 2002), in evaluating historical monetary policy actions
using estimated Taylor rules, the use of ex post revised, as opposed to real-
time, data on economic variables can give misleading inferences about the
stance of monetary policy.
A Taylor rule incorporating the above-noted features is shown below in
(1.3):
FR∗







FRt = ρFRt−1 + (1 − ρ)FR∗
t + νt, (1.2)





















is the current unemploy-
ment gap. Equation (1.1) relates the federal funds rate target to two economic
fundamentals, expected inﬂation and the current unemployment gap. Here-
after, the funds rate target is called the policy rate. The coefﬁcients απ and αu
measure the long-term responses of the funds rate target to expected inﬂation
and the unemployment gap; the inﬂation response coefﬁcient is assumed to
7 The estimation of a Taylor rule using an inﬂation series that employs two or more measures
of inﬂation may mean that the intercept term in the estimated Taylor rule is no longer a constant.
This may happen if different measures of inﬂation exhibit different trend behaviors during the
course of the estimation period and, hence, the Fed’s inﬂation target expressed in these different
inﬂation measures is no longer similar in magnitude.126 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
be positive and the unemployment gap response coefﬁcient is assumed to be
negative, indicating that the Federal Reserve raises its funds rate target if it
expects inﬂation to rise and/or the unemployment gap to fall. Equation (1.2)
is the standard partial adjustment equation, which expresses the current funds
rate as a weighted average of the current funds rate target, FR∗
t , and the last
quarter’s actual value, FRt−1. If the actual funds rate adjusts to its target
within each period, then ρ equals zero, suggesting that the Federal Reserve
does not smooth interest rates. Equation (1.2) also includes a disturbance
term, indicating that in the short run the actual funds rate may deviate from
thevalueimpliedbyeconomicdeterminantsspeciﬁedinthepolicyrule. Ifwe
substitute (1.1) into (1.2), we get (1.3)—a forward-looking “inertial” Taylor
rule.
As in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), the Taylor rules are estimated
assuming rational expectations and using instrumental variables over 1987:1–
2004:4; this sample period spans most of the Greenspan era.8 The key fea-
ture of the estimation procedure used here is that the instrument set includes,
among other variables, Greenbook inﬂation forecasts based on different inﬂa-
tion measures. This strategy differs from the one used in Boivin (2006) and
Mehra and Minton (2007), where forward-looking Taylor rules are estimated
directly using Greenbook forecasts. Given the ﬁve-year lag in the release of
Greenbookforecaststothepublic, thecurrentstrategyenablesonetoestimate
theTaylor rules over most of the Greenspan era (1987:1–2004:4) and then ex-
amine their predictive content for the longer sample period (1987:1–2006:4)
that includes the Bernanke years.9 We end the sample in 2006 in order to
compare results in previous research that indicate monetary policy was too
loose over 2002–2006.
The empirical work presented here suggests several observations. First,
a Taylor rule that is estimated using a time-varying measure of core inﬂation
8 There is considerable evidence that the policy rule followed by the Greenspan Fed differed
from the one followed by the Volcker Fed in one important way. In its attempts to build credibility,
the Volcker Fed responded strongly to long-term inﬂationary expectations imbedded in long bond
yields, in addition to responding to inﬂation and unemployment, the two fundamental variables
suggested by a Taylor rule (Mehra 2001). The long bond rate is generally not signiﬁcant if the
Taylor rule is estimated using data from the Greenspan era because the Greenspan Fed had by
then achieved credibility. For this reason we estimate the Taylor rule using observations only from
the Greenspan era. This strategy is also consistent with the observation that in criticizing the
Greenspan Fed, Taylor (2007) uses a policy rule that includes only inﬂation and unemployment
(output) gap variables.
9 We, however, do compare the robustness of our results to this alternative method of esti-
mating the Taylor rule using Greenbook inﬂation forecasts. Although estimates of policy response
coefﬁcients differ, the estimates yield qualitatively similar conclusions about the relevance of the
inﬂation measure. In particular, the Taylor rule that is estimated using Greenbook forecasts of
core CPI until 2000 and core PCE thereafter tracks actual policy well over 2000:1–2006:4 and
passes the test of parameter stability. That is not the case if the Taylor rule is estimated using
Greenbook forecasts of headline CPI inﬂation. Furthermore, as measured by the root mean squared
error criterion, the Taylor rule with Greenbook forecasts of the time-varying inﬂation measure ﬁts
the data better than the Taylor rule with Greenbook forecasts of headline CPI.Mehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 127
(CPI until 2000 and PCE thereafter) yields reasonable estimates of inﬂation
and unemployment gap response coefﬁcients. The estimated inﬂation re-
sponse coefﬁcient, απ, is positive and way above unity, suggesting that the
GreenspanFedrespondedstronglytoexpectedinﬂation. Theestimatedunem-
ployment gap response coefﬁcient, αu, is negative and statistically signiﬁcant,
suggesting that the Federal Reserve also responded to slack. The Chow test
of parameter stability does not indicate a shift in the estimated parameters
around 2000 when the Federal Reserve switched from CPI to PCE.10 Also,
the estimated Taylor rule tracks the actual path of the federal funds rate fairly
well, especially over the period from 2002–2006.
Incontrast,aTaylorrulethatisestimatedusingheadlineCPIinﬂationdoes
not provide reasonable estimates of policy response coefﬁcients and depicts
parameter instability over 1988:1–2004:4. The estimated Taylor rule based
on headline CPI inﬂation is consistent with the actual funds rate being too
low relative to the level prescribed by the estimated Taylor rule over 2002–
2006, as in Smith andTaylor (2007) andTaylor (2007). These results indicate
that the choice of the measure of inﬂation used in estimated Taylor rules is
not innocuous. Furthermore, one should employ real-time information for
evaluating historical monetary policy actions.
Second, during most of the period from 2001–2006, inﬂation measured
by headline CPI was higher than what would be indicated by core PCE data,
reﬂecting in part the effects of the rise in oil prices on headline inﬂation. The
tests of parameter stability here indicate that the Greenspan Fed did not adjust
the federal funds rate target in response to increases in the headline measure
of CPI inﬂation.11 The lack of policy response to increases in headline CPI
inﬂation reﬂected the Greenspan Fed’s belief that oil price increases were
transitory12 and that core inﬂation is a better gauge of the underlying trend
inﬂation.13
Third, the core measure of PCE inﬂation has been substantially revised
over the years. In particular, real-time estimates of core PCE inﬂation over
10Although the core PCE index was given prominence in Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts in
July 2004, the hypothesis here that the Greenspan Fed in fact paid attention to core measures of
inﬂation implies that the FOMC started paying attention to core PCE much earlier.
11 Several analysts and policymakers have noted that the Greenspan Fed’s policy of focus-
ing on core inﬂation continued through the Bernanke years. See, for example, Kohn (2009) and
Bernanke (2010).
12 During this subperiod most other economists also thought oil price increases were transitory
and hence did not expect the rise in oil prices to lead to persistent increases in headline inﬂation.
For example, despite the actual increase in headline CPI inﬂation, the Survey of Professional
Forecasters forecasts of headline CPI inﬂation did not increase appreciably over 2003:1–2006:4.
See Dokko et al. (2009) for additional evidence on this issue.
13 This belief is consistent with the empirical evidence documented by several analysts that,
for the period since the early 1980s, it is core rather than headline inﬂation that better approximates
the trend component of inﬂation. Some of that empirical evidence is reviewed in Mishkin (2007)
and Kiley (2008) and updated in Mehra and Reilly (2009).128 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2002:1–2005:4 are substantially lower than those indicated by ex post revised
data (vintage 2009). The counterfactual simulations of the federal funds rate
generated using the ex post revised data do suggest that deviations of the
policy rule are somewhat larger than those generated using the real-time data.
However, it would be misleading to conclude from such evidence that the
Greenspan Fed had followed an easier stance on monetary policy.
Our results complement the recent work of Orphanides and Wieland
(2008), who argue that policy actions taken over 1988–2007 have been con-
sistent with a stable Taylor rule and that policy was not too loose over 2001–
2007. They, however, estimate a forecast-based Taylor rule using publicly
available forecasts of inﬂation and unemployment contained in semiannual
Humphrey-Hawkinsreports. Asindicatedbefore, theHumphrey-Hawkinsin-
ﬂationforecastsusedCPIuntil1999,switchingthereaftertothePCEmeasure.
The evidence in this article implies that a forward-looking Taylor rule esti-
mated using actual real-time inﬂation and unemployment data yields identical
results, in particular the conclusion that policy actions are consistent with a
stableTaylorrule,providedweallowforthechangeinthemeasureofinﬂation
used in monetary policy deliberations.14
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the em-
piricalmethodologyandreviewsthedataonthebehaviorofdifferentmeasures
of inﬂation during the Greenspan era. Section 2 presents empirical results,
reproducing the evidence in Taylor (2007, 2009) that the Greenspan Fed set
a funds rate low relative to the Taylor rule. We show that the result in Taylor
disappears if one uses the time-varying measure of inﬂation employed by the
FOMC. Section 3 concludes.
1. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Estimation of the Forward-Looking Inertial
Taylor Rule
The objective of this article is to investigate whether monetary policy actions
taken by the Federal Reserve under Chairman Greenspan can be summarized
by aTaylor rule according to which the Federal Reserve was forward looking,
focused on core inﬂation, smoothed interest rates, and reﬁned the measure
of inﬂation used in monetary policy deliberations. We model the forward-
looking nature of the policy rule by relating the current value of the funds rate
14 Using somewhat different approaches, Dokko et al. (2009) and Bernanke (2010) also show
that actual policy is much closer to the one prescribed by the original Taylor rule if the measure of
inﬂation used in the policy rule is the one employed by the FOMC in monetary policy deliberations
and if real-time data are used. Bernanke (2010) generates the predictions of the policy rate using
the Greenbook inﬂation forecasts until 2004 and the Humphrey-Hawkins forecasts thereafter. Dokko
et al. (2009) generate the predictions of the policy rate employing real-time estimates of core PCE
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target to the expected average annual inﬂation rate and the contemporaneous
unemploymentgap. Thepolicyruleincorporatingthesefeaturesisreproduced
below in equation (2.3):
FRt = ρFRt−1 + (1 − ρ)
 
α0 + απEt ¯ πc






where the expected average annual inﬂation rate, Et ¯ πc
¯ 4, is measured by the
average of one-through-four-quarter-ahead expected values of core inﬂation
made at time t, and other variables are deﬁned as before.15
The estimation of the policy rule (2.3) raises several issues. The ﬁrst
issue relates to how we measure expected inﬂation and the unemployment
gap. The second issue relates to the nature of data used in estimation, namely,
whether it is the real-time or ﬁnal revised data. As indicated earlier, the use of
revisedasopposedtoreal-timedatamayaffectestimatesofpolicycoefﬁcients
and may provide a misleading historical analysis of policy actions. The third
issue is an econometric one, arising as a result of the potential presence of
serial correlation in the error term νt. Rudebusch (2002, 2006) points out that
the Federal Reserve may respond to other economic factors besides expected
inﬂation and the unemployment gap and, hence, aTaylor rule estimated while
omitting those other factors is likely to have a serially correlated error term.
The presence of serial correlation in the disturbance term, if ignored, may
spuriously indicate that the Federal Reserve is smoothing interest rates.
To understand how a serially correlated disturbance term may mistakenly
indicate the presence of partial adjustment, note ﬁrst that if the funds rate
does partially adjust to the policy rate as shown in (1.2) and the disturbance
term has no serial correlation, then the reduced-form policy rule in (1.3) or
(2.3) has the lagged funds rate as one of the explanatory variables. Hence, the
empirical ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the lagged funds rate in the
estimated policy rule may be interpreted as indicating the presence of interest
rate smoothing. But now assume that there is no partial adjustment, ρ = 0i n
(2.3), but instead the disturbance term is serially correlated as shown below
in (3.1):
νt = sνt−1 + εt, (3.1)










t,jj = 1,2,3,4 is the j-quarter-ahead expected value of
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FRt = sFRt−1 +
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If we substitute (3.1) into (2.3), it can be easily shown that we get the
reduced-form policy rule (3.2) in which, among other variables, the lagged
funds rate also enters the policy rule. Hence, the empirical ﬁnding of a signif-
icant coefﬁcient on the lagged funds rate in the estimated policy rule may be
interpreted as arising as a result of interest rate smoothing when in fact it is
not present. In view of these considerations, the policy rule here is estimated
allowingforthepresenceofbothinterestratesmoothingandserialcorrelation,
namely, we allow both partial adjustment and a serially correlated disturbance
term. It can be easily shown that the policy rule incorporating both partial
adjustment and serial correlation can be expressed











(1 − ρ)απEt−1 ¯ πc





−sρFRt−2 + εt. (4)
Note, if there is no serial correlation (s = 0 in [4]), we get the reduced-
form policy rule shown in (2.3), and if there is no partial adjustment (ρ = 0
in [4]), we get the policy rule shown in (3.2). Of course, if both s and ρ
are not zero, we have a policy rule with both partial adjustment and serial
correlation.16
In previous research, a forward-looking policy rule such as the one given
in (2.3) has often been estimated assuming rational expectations and using a
generalized method of moments procedure (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000).
We follow this literature and estimate the policy rule assuming rational ex-
pectations, namely, we substitute actual future core inﬂation for the expected
inﬂation term and use an instrumental variables procedure to estimate policy
coefﬁcients. Given the evidence that the Greenbook forecasts are most ap-
propriate in capturing policymakers’ real-time assessment of future inﬂation
developments, we include the Greenbook forecasts in the instruments.17 In
16 Estimating the policy rule allowing for the presence of serial correlation produces more
robust estimates of policy parameters including the partial adjustment coefﬁcient. Moreover, the
policy rule is estimated using the quasi-differenced data, as can be seen in equation (3.2). This
quasi-differencing of data minimizes the spurious regression phenomenon noted in Granger and
Newbold (1974).
17 Romer and Romer (2000) have shown that the Federal Reserve has an informational ad-
vantage over the private sector, producing relatively more accurate forecasts of inﬂation than does
the private sector. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) argue that one needs a large set of conditional
information to properly model monetary policy. In that respect, the Greenbook forecasts includeMehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 131
Figure 1 Actual Inﬂation (Real-Time)
Panel A: Headline CPI and Core CPI (4Q Average)
Panel B: Headline CPI Minus Core CPI
Panel C: Headline CPI and Core PCE
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addition, we estimate the policy rule allowing for the presence of both in-
terest rate smoothing and serial correlation as in (4) and use the nonlinear
instrumental variables procedure. The instruments used are the three lagged
values of Greenbook inﬂation forecasts, the federal funds rate, levels of the
unemployment gap, and the spread between the 10-year Treasury bond yield
and the federal funds rate. As indicated earlier, the policy rule is estimated
over 1988:1–2004:4, given the ﬁve-year lag in the release of the Greenbook
forecasts to the public.18
real-time information from a wide range of sources, including the Board staff’s “judgment,” not
otherwise directly measurable.
18 The estimation period begins in 1988:1 because the instrument set includes the lagged
values of economic variables. As a check on the adequacy of the instruments variables proce-
dure, we ran the ﬁrst-stage regressions for the endogenous variables (expected inﬂation and the132 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 Real-Time Versus Vintage 2009 Core Inﬂation
Panel A: Core CPI (4Q Average)
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Data
Weestimatethepolicyrulein(4)usingreal-timedataoncoreinﬂationandthe
unemployment gap. The data on core inﬂation came from the real-time data
set maintained at the Philadelphia Fed.19 The data on real-time estimates of
theNAIRUwerethosepreparedbytheCongressionalBudgetOfﬁce(CBO).20
The Greenbook forecasts of core inﬂation used in the instrument list are those
prepared for the FOMC held near the second month of the quarter.
contemporaneous unemployment gap). In the ﬁrst stage regressions, the R-squared statistics are
fairly large, ranging from .45 to .97, suggesting the endogenous variables are highly correlated
with the instruments.
19 The empirical work used the preliminary estimates of core PCE inﬂation, usually released
by the end of the ﬁrst month of a quarter. The Greenbook forecasts used as instruments were
the ones prepared for the FOMC meetings held near the second month of a quarter. This timing
means that the Board staff preparing the Greenbook forecasts had information about the preliminary
estimates of core inﬂation rates in previous quarters. However, none of the conclusions reported
here would change if we had used third release estimates, usually reported by the end of the third
month of the quarter.
20 In January of each year from 1991–2006, the CBO released estimates of the NAIRU. For
the period 1987–1990, the estimates used are those given in the 1991 vintage data ﬁle. For 1991,
we used the pertinent series on the NAIRU from the 1992 vintage data ﬁle and so on for each
year thereafter.Mehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 133
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PanelA in Figure 1 charts the four-quarter averages of real-time headline
and core CPI inﬂation rates from 1988:1–1999:4, and Panel C charts the av-
erages of headline CPI and core PCE inﬂation rates from 2000:1–2006:4. As
can be seen, headline and core CPI inﬂation series stay together for most of
the period before 2000 (see Panel B). However, over 2000:1–2006:4, headline
CPI inﬂation remained above core PCE inﬂation (see Panel D), suggesting
that a policy rule that relates the policy rate to headline CPI inﬂation is likely
to prescribe a higher federal funds rate target than a policy rule that relates the
policy rate to core PCE inﬂation, ceteris paribus. Hence, given the different
behavior of headline CPI inﬂation and core PCE inﬂation rates over this sub-
period, the measure of inﬂation used in the estimated Taylor rule will matter
for predicting the stance of monetary policy.
Figures 2 and 3 chart real-time and 2009 vintage estimates of economic
fundamentals that enter the Taylor rules; Figure 2 charts the four-quarter av-
erage of core CPI and core PCE inﬂation rates, whereas Figure 3 charts the
unemployment gap. Two observations are noteworthy. First, core PCE in-
ﬂation data have been extensively revised over the years, and there are big
discrepancies between real-time and revised estimates of core PCE inﬂation.
In particular, real-time estimates of the four-quarter average of PCE inﬂation134 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 4 Greenbook Inﬂation Forecasts andActual Future Inﬂation
(4QAverage)
Panel A: Core CPI: Greenbook Forecasts and Actual Future Inflation
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ratesweresubstantiallybelowthe2009vintageestimatesover2002:1–2005:4
(see Figure 2, Panel B). Second, the unemployment gap data is also revised,
but discrepancies between the real-time and 2009 vintage estimates are small
and do not increase appreciably over 2001–2006 (see Figure 3).




1997 when the Greenbook forecasts turned out to be too pessimistic. For the
later period, the Greenbook forecasts of core PCE inﬂation do not fare as
well in predicting actual core inﬂation. In particular, in 2003:1–2004:4, the
Greenbook forecasts of core PCE inﬂation indicated deceleration in expected
inﬂation, butactualcorePCEinﬂationturnedouttobemuchhigherthanwhat
theBoardstaffpredicted. ThefearofexpecteddeﬂationimplicitinGreenbook
forecasts of declining future inﬂation is used by some analysts to argue that
the Greenspan Fed may have kept the federal funds rate target too low for too
long during this subperiod. However, it is for a very short span that actual
core inﬂation was higher than what the Board staff forecasted. The resultMehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 135
Table 1 Estimated Taylor Rules
Row End Period Inﬂation απ αy ρs SER
1 1999:4 Core CPI + PCE 1.6 −1.3 .56 .62 .322
(5.3) (4.3) (3.3) (2.9)
2 2004:4 Core CPI + PCE 1.9 −1.4 .52 .67 .331
(8.2) (5.5) (6.4) (3.6)
3 1999:4 Headline CPI 1.5 −1.0 .72 .61 .352
(2.9) (2.3) (5.8) (3.2)
4 2004:4 Headline CPI .1 −2.4 .40 .97 .347
(.3) (−4.9) (2.6) (3.3)
5 1999:4 Core CPI 1.6 −1.3 .56 .62 .322
(5.4) (4.3) (3.3) (2.9)
6 2004:4 Core CPI 1.6 −1.4 .60 .75 .324
(3.1) (3.0) (4.3) (4.4)
Notes: Rows labeled 1 through 4 contain nonlinear instrumental variables estimates of
policy coefﬁcients from the forward-looking policy rule given below in (a) and use real-
time data on inﬂation and the unemployment gap:
FRt = α0 (1 − s)(1 − ρ) + (s + ρ)FRt−1 + (1 − ρ)
 
απEt ¯ πc







(1 − ρ)απEt−1 ¯ πc





− sρFRt−2 + εt. (a)
The instruments used are three lagged values of Greenbook inﬂation forecasts, the funds
rate, unemployment gap, the growth gap, and the spread between nominal yields on 10-
year Treasury bonds and the federal funds rate. Parentheses contain t-values. SER is the
standard error of estimate. Estimation was done allowing for the presence of ﬁrst-order
serial correlation in νt, and s is the estimated ﬁrst-order serial correlation coefﬁcient.
The sample periods begin in 1988:1 and end in the year shown in the column labeled
“End Period.”
here—that a rational expectations version of the Taylor rule estimated using
real-time data tracks the actual funds rate target well—implies that the fear of
deﬂation may have played a limited role in keeping the funds rate target low
during this subperiod.
2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents and discusses policy response coefﬁcients from Taylor
rules that are estimated using different measures of inﬂation. It also examines
the stability of policy response coefﬁcients using the Chow test with the break
data around 2000, when the Greenspan Fed switched from focusing on CPI
to PCE inﬂation measure.
Estimates of Policy Response Coefﬁcients
Table 1 presents estimates of policy response coefﬁcients (απ,αu) from the
Taylor rule in equation (4) for two sample periods, 1988:1–1999:4 and136 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
1988:1–2004:4. Rows 1 and 2 present estimates using the time-varying mea-
sure of core inﬂation, and rows 3 and 4 present estimates for headline CPI
inﬂation measure. Focusing ﬁrst on estimates of the Taylor rule with the
time-varying measure of core inﬂation, all estimated policy response coef-
ﬁcients are correctly signed and statistically signiﬁcant. In particular, the
inﬂation response coefﬁcient απ is generally well above unity, suggesting that
the Greenspan Fed responded strongly to expected inﬂation. Furthermore, in
both sample periods, estimated policy response coefﬁcients remain correctly
signed and are statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting parameter stability.21,22
Focusing on estimates of the Taylor rule with headline CPI inﬂation, we
ﬁnd that estimated policy response coefﬁcients are sensitive to the sample pe-
riod. For the sample period ending in 1999:4, the estimated policy response
coefﬁcients are correctly signed and statistically signiﬁcant. The estimated
inﬂation response coefﬁcient is 1.5, well above unity, and the estimated un-
employmentgapresponsecoefﬁcientisclosetounity. However,theestimated
policy response coefﬁcients are not stable across the two sample periods. In
particular, the estimated inﬂation response coefﬁcient falls below unity and
is no longer statistically signiﬁcant when the policy rule is estimated over
1988:1–2004:4 (see Table 1, Row 4). This result is similar in spirit to the one
in Smith and Taylor (2007), who estimate a Taylor rule over 1984:1–2005:4
andﬁndthattheestimatedinﬂationresponsecoefﬁcientdeclinedsigniﬁcantly
in 2002, leading them to conclude that the Greenspan Fed had become less
responsive to inﬂation.
Parameter Stability
We formally test for stability of policy response coefﬁcients in the Taylor
rule over 1988:1–2004:4 using the Chow test and treating the break date as
unknown. Since the FOMC switched to the PCE measure of inﬂation in
21 Other estimated coefﬁcients of interest are also correctly signed. The estimated serial cor-
relation coefﬁcient, s, is generally positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating the presence of
serially correlated errors in the estimated policy rules. As noted in Rudebusch (2006), the presence
of serial correlation may reﬂect inﬂuences on the policy rate of economic variables to which the
Federal Reserve may have responded but that are omitted from the estimated policy rule. Further-
more, even after allowing for the presence of serial correlation, the estimated partial adjustment
coefﬁcient, ρ, is positive and well above zero, suggesting that the continued role of partial adjust-
ment in generating a signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the lagged value of the funds rate. This result is in
line with the one in English, Nelson, and Sack (2002). However, the magnitude of the estimated
partial adjustment coefﬁcient, ρ, reported here is somewhat smaller than what is found in previous
research.
22 The empirical work employed the inﬂation series using CPI until 2000:4 and PCE there-
after. The estimates of the policy response coefﬁcients do not change much if the policy rule is
alternatively estimated using CPI until 2000:1 and PCE thereafter. Furthermore, the test of parame-
ter stability discussed in the next section was implemented for all break dates over 2000:1–2001:4.
As discussed later, the estimated policy rule employing the time-varying measure of inﬂation did
not indicate a break in policy response coefﬁcients for any of the break dates.Mehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 137
Table 2 Test for Stability of Policy Coefﬁcients in Policy Rules
Breakpoint Policy Rule Policy Rule Policy Rule
Core CPI + Core PCE Headline CPI Core CPI
(A) (B) (C)
2000Q1 .86 .04 .22
2000Q2 .95 .02 .19
2000Q3 .46 .01 .16
2000Q4 .30 .01 .17
2001Q1 .41 .00 .05
2001Q2 .17 .00 .01
2001Q3 .65 .00 .19
2001Q4 .75 .00 .35
Notes: The values reported are p-values of a test of the null hypothesis in which policy
coefﬁcients, including the intercept in the policy rule, were stable against the alternative
in which coefﬁcients changed at the indicated date. Since the test is implemented in-
cluding dummy variables in the policy rule given in equation (a) in the Table 1 Notes,
the reported p-values are a test of the null hypothesis in which coefﬁcients on slope
dummies, including the intercept, did not change at the indicated date.
2000, we look for a break in the estimated Taylor rule around that period.
In particular, for each date between 2000:1–2001:4, we include intercept and




the indicated date. The column labeled (A) reports p-values generated using
the Taylor rule that employed the time-varying measure of core inﬂation,
whereas the column labeled (B) does so for the Taylor rule with headline CPI
inﬂation. As can be seen, there is no date in the interval 2000:1–2001:4 at
which one could claim to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant break in the Taylor
rule if one uses a time-varying measure of core inﬂation. In contrast, there are
several dates one could ﬁnd the evidence of a break in relation if the Taylor
rule is estimated using headline CPI inﬂation (see column B).The latter result
is similar in spirit to the one in Smith and Taylor (2007).23
23 The test for parameter stability was implemented using intercept and slope dummies. In
the case of the policy rule that was estimated using the time-varying measure of inﬂation, both the
intercept and slope dummy coefﬁcients were not different from zero, suggesting that there was no
shift in the intercept of the policy rule in response to change in the measure of inﬂation employed.
In contrast, when the policy rule is estimated using headline CPI, the slope dummy coefﬁcient on
the inﬂation response coefﬁcient is relatively small, suggesting that the Federal Reserve did not
respond as aggressively to headline inﬂation as it did before. This result is in line with the inﬂation
response coefﬁcient becoming insigniﬁcant when the policy rule is estimated over 1988:1–2004:4
(compare estimates across rows 3 and 4, Table 1).138 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 5 Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
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Predicting the Policy Rate Using a Taylor Rule based
on Core Inﬂation: Was the Fed Off the Taylor Rule
over 2001:1–2006:4?
In order to evaluate whether monetary policy actions over 2000:1–2006:4 can
be explained by a Taylor rule, we generate predictions of the policy rate using
the estimated Taylor rules. We consider two Taylor rules that differ with
respect to the measure of inﬂation, and we generate both dynamic and static










ˆ α0 +ˆ απ ¯ πc






where FRp is the predicted funds rate and the other variables are deﬁned as
before. As can be seen in the prediction equation given in (5), in generating
the current quarter predicted value of the funds rate, we use last quarter’s
predicted value of the federal funds rate rather than the actual value, while
using current-period values of the other two economic fundamentals. As a
result, the current funds rate is a distributed lag on current and past values of
expected inﬂation and the unemployment gap.Mehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 139
Figure 6 Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
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In contrast, the static predictions of the policy rate are generated while
also paying attention to recent policy actions, in addition to economic funda-
mentals. In particular, the static predictions are generated using the estimated
policy rule as shown in (6):
FR
p




ˆ α0 +ˆ απ ¯ πc






The policy rule shown in (6) is similar to the one in (5) with the exception that
(6) uses last quarter’s actual value of the federal funds rate. Thus, in the static
exercise the current forecast is inﬂuenced in part by actual policy actions, the
magnitude of the inﬂuence of policy on the forecast being determined by the
size of the partial adjustment coefﬁcient, ρ.24
24 Since the dynamic predictions are generated by paying attention only to expected inﬂa-
tion and the unemployment gap, they are better at revealing certain types of misspeciﬁcation. In
particular, if the federal funds rate equation is misspeciﬁed because it is estimated ignoring the
inﬂuences of some other economic fundamentals, then the dynamic predictions generated using
such a policy rule are likely to be poor proxies for the actual behavior of the federal funds rate.
Hence, the dynamic predictions are better at gauging the ﬁt of the estimated policy rule than are
the static predictions.140 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 7 Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
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Figures 5 and 6 respectively chart the dynamic and static predictions of
the funds rate from the Taylor rule that is estimated using the time-varying
measure of core inﬂation.25 Actual values of the funds rate and the prediction
errors are also charted there. Two observations need to be highlighted. First,
theestimatedpolicyrulepredictsverywellthebroadcontoursofthepolicyrate
over 1988:1–2006:4. The mean absolute error is .47 percentage points when
dynamicpredictionsareusedand.30percentagepointswhenstaticpredictions
are used. The root mean squared error is .60 percentage points when dynamic
predictions are used, whereas it is only .38 percentage points when static
predictions are used. Secondly, focusing on the period from 2000:1–2006:4,
thereisnoevidenceofpersistentlylargepredictionerrors,andmostprediction
errors are small in magnitude (below twice the root mean squared error),
suggesting that the actual funds rate is well predicted and, hence, that the
Greenspan-Bernanke Fed was “on” a Taylor rule.
25 The predictions begin in 1988:1. For generating the prediction for 1988:2, we use last
quarter’s actual funds rate. For later periods, the predicted values are generated using last period’s
predicted value and current period estimates of expected inﬂation and the unemployment gap.Mehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 141
Figure 8 Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
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Predicting the Policy Rate Using a Taylor Rule Based
on Headline CPI Inﬂation: Was the Fed Off the
Taylor Rule over 2001:1–2006:4?
Figures 7 and 8 respectively chart the dynamic and static predictions of the
policy rate from the Taylor rule estimated using headline CPI inﬂation. Two
observations are noteworthy. First, this Taylor rule does not predict well the
broad contours of the policy rate. The mean absolute error is 1.1 percentage
points and the root mean squared error is 1.5 percentage points, based on
dynamic prediction of the policy rate. The summary measures of predictive
performance improve somewhat when they are calculated using the static
predictionerrors—themeanabsoluteerroris.46percentagepointsandtheroot
mean squared error is .56 percentage points. Secondly, focusing on the period
from 2000:1–2006:4, there is clear evidence of persistently large negative
prediction errors, and many of these prediction errors are large in magnitude
(see lower panels, Figures 7 and 8). According to this Taylor rule, the actual
funds rate remained consistently below the level prescribed, implying policy
was too loose for most of the period over 2000:1–2006:4—a result that is in
line with the ones in Smith and Taylor (2007) and Taylor (2007).142 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 9 Counterfactual Simulations
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Role of Data Revisions
Figure 2 shows that data on core PCE inﬂation have been extensively revised
overtheyears,particularlyfortheperiod2002–2005whenreal-timeestimates
of core PCE inﬂation are substantially below the 2009 vintage estimates. Fig-
ures 9 and 10 chart, respectively, the counterfactual dynamic and static sim-
ulations of the policy rate generated using 2009 vintage data on economic
fundamentals.26 For a comparison, the predictions generated using real-time
data are also charted. As can be seen, deviations of the policy rule using the
2009 vintage data are somewhat larger than those generated using real-time
data. However, it would be misleading to conclude from such evidence that
the Federal Reserve was too loose.27
26 The policy rule is estimated using real-time data over 1988:1–2004:4. The dynamic predic-
tions are, however, generated using not real-time but 2009 vintage estimates of core PCE inﬂation
and the unemployment gap.
27 Many analysts have examined other indicators of inﬂation available in real time and con-
clude that monetary policy was not inﬂationary, despite the low level of the federal funds rate
target. For example, Dokko et al. (2009) have examined the commercially available inﬂation fore-
casts of the private sector as well as the inﬂation forecasts made by the individual members the
FOMC published in the Humphrey-Hawkins reports over 2003–2006. They concluded that all those
inﬂation forecasts were consistent with the Federal Reserve’s informal inﬂation target of betweenMehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 143
Figure10 Counterfactual Simulations
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Role of Deﬂation Fears
Some analysts, focusing on theTaylor rule estimated using CPI inﬂation mea-
sure, contend that, over the period 2002:1–2005:4, the Greenspan Fed may
have kept the federal funds rate too low for too long in order to avoid the
consequences of a Japanese-style deﬂation. According to this explanation,
internal forecasts of the U.S. inﬂation rate indicated the possibility of deﬂa-
tion, which led the Greenspan Fed to keep the short-term interest rate low
for an extended period of time. There is some limited support for this view
in Figure 4, which shows that the Greenbook forecasts of core PCE inﬂation
indicated substantial deceleration of expected inﬂation for most of the period
over 2002:1–2005:4. However, actual core PCE inﬂation did not decline to
levels indicated by the Greenbook forecast. Also, as shown above, the actual
funds rate is close to what is prescribed by a forward-looking Taylor rule es-
timated using real-time data on the fundamentals, namely, core PCE inﬂation
1.5 percent to 2 percent. Others focusing on the bond market measures of inﬂationary expectations
point out that, over this subperiod, long-term rates exhibited considerable stability that is consistent
with the presence of a noninﬂationary policy stance, despite the low level of the federal funds
rate.144 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure11 Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
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and the unemployment gap. The empirical work here suggests that, while the
fear of deﬂation may have played some role, the actual funds rate remained
low for fundamental reasons once we recognize that the Greenspan Fed was
focused not on headline CPI but on a core measure of PCE inﬂation.
Headline CPI Versus Core CPI
The result here—that a forward-looking Taylor rule estimated using a head-
line measure of CPI inﬂation does not depict parameter stability during the
Greenspan years—continues to hold if the Taylor rule is instead estimated
using a core measure of CPI inﬂation. In fact, several analysts, including
Blinder and Reis (2005), have estimated Taylor rules using a core measure
of CPI inﬂation. But, as shown below, the use of a core measure of CPI
inﬂation does generate reasonable estimates of policy response coefﬁcients;
the estimated policy rule, however, does not depict parameter stability in the
Greenspan years. Table 1 presents policy response coefﬁcients estimated us-
ing core CPI inﬂation data and Table 2 presents p-values of the Chow test
of parameter stability (see column C). As can be seen, estimated policy re-
sponsecoefﬁcientsappearreasonable. However,theestimatedpolicyrulestillMehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 145
Figure12 Forward-Looking Taylor Rule
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exhibits parameter instability in 2001; the test results indicate a reduction in
thesizeoftheinﬂationresponsecoefﬁcient, consistentwiththeobservationin
Taylor (2007) that the Greenspan Fed did not react strongly to inﬂation after
2001. Figures11and12chartthedynamicandstaticsimulationsofthefederal
funds rate using the estimated Taylor rule based on the core measure of CPI
inﬂation. As can be seen, the actual funds rate is considerably below the value
prescribed by this policy rule for most of the subperiod from 2001:1–2006:4.
Usingthemetricofsummaryerrorstatisticsbasedondynamicpredictions,we
calculate the mean absolute error as .70 percentage points and the root mean
squared error as .86 percentage points. By this metric, the Taylor rule esti-
matedusingcoreCPIdoesbetterthantheTaylorruleestimatedusingheadline
CPI inﬂation. However, neither of these Taylor rules depict parameter stabil-
ity and both are consistent with policy by being “too loose” over most of the
period 2002:1–2006:4.
Forward- Versus Backward-Looking Taylor Rules
The empirical work here has used forward-looking Taylor rules to show that
the measure of inﬂation chosen matters for predicting actual policy actions146 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure13 Backward-Looking Taylor Rule
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over 2002:1–2006:4, namely, a Taylor rule estimated using the time-varying
measureofcoreinﬂationtracksactualpolicybetterthanaTaylorruleestimated
using headline CPI inﬂation. However, it may be noted that the above result
continues to hold if one estimates and compares backward-looking Taylor
rules. Namely, a backward-looking Taylor rule estimated using the time-
varying measure of core inﬂation tracks actual policy actions much better
than does a Taylor rule with headline CPI inﬂation (see Figures 13 and 14).
However, backward-looking Taylor rules generally do not depict parameter
stability, evenwhentheyareestimatedusingthetime-varyingmeasureofcore
inﬂation.28
28 The Taylor rules considered in this exercise were estimated using smoothed lagged values
of inﬂation and unemployment gap variables, as in the original Taylor rule. We also estimated
versions in which we include a lagged value of the federal funds rate, thereby directly allowing
interest rate smoothing. This speciﬁcation gave qualitatively similar results.Mehra/Sawhney: Inﬂation, Taylor Rules, Greenspan-BernankeYears 147
Figure14 Backward-Looking Taylor Rule
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The empirical results above suggest that monetary policy actions in the
Greenspan era can be summarized by a stable Taylor rule according to which
theFederalReservewasforwardlooking,smoothedinterestrates,andfocused
onacoremeasureofinﬂationmeasuredbyCPIuntil2000andPCEthereafter.
The estimated Taylor rule does not depict any parameter instability, despite
the switch in the measure of inﬂation used in monetary policy deliberations.
In contrast, Taylor rules that do not allow for this switch in the measure of
inﬂation, and are instead estimated using CPI inﬂation (headline or core), de-
pict parameter instability around 2000, indicating that the Greenspan Fed did
not react strongly to expected (CPI) inﬂation.
Within the context of aTaylor-type policy rule, a switch in the measure of
inﬂation is likely to affect the policy rule mainly by altering the constant term
of the policy rule if the switch leads to a different inﬂation target expressed
in a new inﬂation measure. This occurs because the constant term in a Taylor
rule has embedded in it the Fed’s estimate of its inﬂation target. However,
the constant term in a Taylor rule also has embedded in it the Fed’s estimate
of the economy’s real rate of interest. To see it, rewrite equation (1.1) as148 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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, where rr∗ is the
real rate and π∗ is the inﬂation target. If we substitute the above equation into
equation(1.2),wegetequation(1.3),wheretheconstanttermisnowdeﬁnedas
α0 = rr∗+(1 − απ)π∗. The constant term thus has embedded in it the Fed’s
estimates of the real rate of interest as well as its inﬂation target. However, as
is well known, given a reduced-form estimate of the constant term, we can’t
recovertheFed’sestimatesoftherealrateaswellasitsinﬂationtargetwithout
bringing in additional information.
The switch in the measure of inﬂation from core CPI to core PCE does
not appear to be associated with any signiﬁcant shift in the estimated Taylor
rule used to explain monetary policy actions in the Greenspan years.29 One
possible explanation of why the switch did not lead to any signiﬁcant shift in
the estimated Taylor rule is that while the switch may have lowered the Fed’s
inﬂation target expressed in core PCE inﬂation, it may have also caused the
Greenspan Fed to raise its assessment of the economy’s real rate of interest,
thereby leaving the constant term of the estimated Taylor rule unchanged.30
3. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This article shows that the measure of inﬂation used in estimating Taylor
rules to explain historical monetary policy actions is not innocuous. The
FOMC under the chairmanship of Alan Greenspan reﬁned the measure of
inﬂation used in monetary policy deliberations, switching from focusing on
CPI to focusing on PCE in the early 1980s. Moreover, Chairman Greenspan
encouraged both the FOMC and the ﬁnancial markets to focus on core rather
than headline inﬂation in implementing policy. As noted in Blinder and Reis
(2005), during the Greenspan era an oil shock was considered a “blip” in
the inﬂation process that did not affect long-term inﬂationary expectations
and therefore should be ignored, leading the Fed to focus on core rather than
headline inﬂation in the implementation of monetary policy.
If we estimate a Taylor rule that uses real-time data and we employ the
time-varying measure of core inﬂation, then the estimated policy rule depicts
29 This result is consistent with the test results of parameter stability discussed above. For
each possible break date between 2000:1–2001:4, the Chow test of parameter stability was per-
formed including intercept as well as slope dummies on response coefﬁcients in the policy rule.
For all the break dates, the intercept dummy was not statistically different from zero, which is
consistent with the absence of a change in the constant term of the policy rule.
30 Using the metric of comparing means, the sample mean of core PCE inﬂation rates over
1987:1–2005:4 is 2.5 percent, which is lower than the value (3.1 percent) computed using core CPI
inﬂation rates over the same period. Given the differential trend behavior of these two inﬂation
measures, the Greenspan Fed having an inﬂation target of, say, 2 percent based on the behavior
of core PCE inﬂation is equivalent to its having an inﬂation target of 2.6 percent based on the
core CPI inﬂation measure. Hence, the switch from CPI to PCE measure of inﬂation could have
been associated with a downward shift in the constant term of the estimated Taylor rule around
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parameter stability in the Greenspan era and predicts very well the actual path
of the federal funds rate over 2001:1–2006:4. In contrast, a Taylor rule that
is estimated using headline CPI inﬂation depicts parameter instability and
indicates the actual funds rate was too low relative to the level prescribed, as
headline CPI inﬂation remained above core PCE inﬂation during most of this
short period. Hence, in evaluating monetary policy actions in the Greenspan
era, it is important to pay attention to these two real-time features of monetary
policy deliberations, namely, the focus on core rather than headline inﬂation
measures and the switch from CPI inﬂation to PCE inﬂation.
Following John Taylor’s (2007) work, many analysts and some policy-
makers have begun to contend that, over 2002:1–2005:4, the Federal Reserve
may have lowered the federal funds rate too low for too long, suggesting that
monetary policy was too loose as seen through the lens of a Taylor rule. The
popularexplanationofthiseasierstanceonmonetarypolicyduringthisperiod
is that the Greenspan Fed feared deﬂation. In fact, the Greenbook forecasts of
corePCEinﬂationindicatedsubstantialdecelerationinexpectedinﬂationdur-
ing this subperiod, which did not materialize. However, the result here—that
a forward-looking Taylor rule estimated using real-time core PCE inﬂation
data tracks the actual funds rate well—implies that the actual funds rate was
determinedforfundamentalreasons. Inrealtime,theFed’spreferredmeasure
of core PCE inﬂation ﬂuctuated in a low narrow range.
The core measure of PCE inﬂation has been extensively revised over the
years. Inparticular,themostrecent2009vintagedataindicatesthatover2002–
2006, core PCE inﬂation did not decelerate as much and was substantially
higher than what the Federal Reserve knew in real time. When seen through
the lens of a Taylor rule, policy deviations using the 2009 vintage data are
somewhat larger than those generated using the real-time data. However, it
would be misleading to conclude from such evidence that monetary policy
was too easy. Several other indicators of inﬂationary expectations that were
available in real time indicate policy was noninﬂationary over this subperiod.
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